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Among the key issues in contemporary political debates across Europe are 
questions relating to migration, to the social and political rights of migrants 
and minorities and how these questions relate to new forms of citizenship in 
specific national contexts as well as across Europe as a whole. In this paper we 
want to explore the changing dynamics of debates about citizenship, 
migration, inclusion and exclusion in four European countries – Britain, 
France, Germany and Italy. Drawing on recent research we have carried out in 
each of these countries we analyse some of the key dimensions of recent 
debates and their impact on policy agendas, arguing for an analysis that 
reflects the various types of migration and movements of people that are 
shaping the current situation in many societies.  
 
Introduction 
An important underlying concern of the research we are conducting has been 
the need to explore the ways in which citizenship and identity have been 
shaped by migration patterns, and the ways in which migration policies and 
politics relating to minority and migrant groups have themselves been 
constructed in response to particular understandings of citizenship and 
national identity (Lessana 1998). Debates in Europe have tended to revolve 
around the nature of citizenship: whether national citizenship is being 
undermined by migration (Bauböck and Rundell 1998; Jacobson 1996; Joppke 
1999a), whether it is being superceded by other forms of citizenship (Soysal 
1994); its usefulness for migrants as a means acquiring cultural, economic, 
social and political rights (Castles and Davidson 2000; Cohen 1987; Favell 
1998a; Koopmans and Statham 1998); and around its relationship to ethnicity 
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(Peck 1992; Wieviorka 1998). In addition we have seen related debates 
emerge about the changing forms of national identity in the context of growing 
multiculturalism and contrasting claims to rights and representation by both 
minorities and majorities (Kymlicka 1995; Solomos 1998). Racism, in a 
variety of manifestations, is an important social and political issue in each of 
the four states – shaped by and shaping policy relating to citizenship and 
migration, and relations between communities in the different states.  
 
The analysis in this paper is organised into four interlinked parts. The first 
explores the changing terms of some of those debates about citizenship and 
migration in contemporary European societies and outlines four analytical 
models that have been used to frame accounts of the position of migrants and 
minorities in the context of the changing role of the nation-state. We then 
move on to explore the implications of these analytical models for an analysis 
of the political and policy agendas about citizenship and immigration. This 
part draws on empirical examples from research in our four case study 
countries. In part four we take this analysis a step further by looking at the 
shifting boundaries of citizenship in the contemporary environment. Finally 
we conclude by highlighting some of the key themes that follow from the 
substantive parts of the paper, by focusing specifically on processes of 
exclusion and inclusion. 
 
Conceptual and Research Agendas 
We begin by reviewing key conceptual debates that have shaped much of the 
recent research on the changing dynamics of citizenship, migration and 
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ethnicity in contemporary Europe. Among other themes, scholars have 
focused on the role that citizenship can and should play in protecting and 
including minority and migrant groups within multicultural societies 
(Gutmann 1992; Kymlicka 1995, 1997; Wieviorka 1998), on the processes of 
exclusion that accompany the creation and maintenance of the state and of the 
nation (Zolberg et al 1989; Colley 1992), and hence of citizenship (Peck 
1992), as well as the economic, political and social functions of maintaining 
the distinctions that divide societies (Bovenkerk, Miles and Verbunt 1991; 
Miles 1994).  
 
Citizenship and migration form part of a matrix with questions of identity, 
nationality and ethnicity. Within both popular and academic discourse there is 
growing evidence of concern about how questions of citizenship can be 
reconceptualised in the context of multicultural societies. Some important 
elements of this debate are issues such as the political rights of minorities, 
including the issue of representation in both local and national politics, and the 
position of minority religious and cultural rights in societies which are 
becoming more diverse. Underlying all of these concerns is the much more 
thorny issue of what, if anything, can be done to protect the rights of 
minorities and develop extensive notions of citizenship and democracy that 
include those minorities that are excluded on racial and ethnic criteria (Canefe 
1998). 
 
This becomes even more clear if we look at specific issues of public policy 
that frame contemporary debates, such as the role of ‘multiculturalism’ in 
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contemporary societies. Christian Joppke, on the basis of a comparative 
analysis of recent trends in the United States, Germany and Britain has argued 
that contemporary debates about multiculturalism need to be understood 
against the background of social movements that demand equal rights and 
recognition for a range of social groups (Joppke 1996: 449). It is also clear 
that multiculturalism is inherently contradictory, both in conceptual and 
political terms, and is often the subject of intense political conflict and debate. 
Joppke goes on to argue that multiculturalism may be characterised as a 
‘politics of difference’ that fuses egalitarian rhetoric with a stress on 
authenticity and rejection of Western universalism (Joppke 1996: 449). 
 
From this perspective debates about multiculturalism in advanced industrial 
societies can be seen as being partly about (i) the struggle for equality by 
minorities who are excluded from equal inclusion in society, and (ii) the 
affirmation of cultural difference through claims to ethnic and racial 
authenticity. It is precisely this complexity of pressures that has helped to 
produce often contradictory debates about the role of multiculturalism in 
different societies.  
 
It is also clear, however, that in practice policies that are labelled 
‘multiculturalist’ have arisen in particular historical environments and political 
cultures. Stephen Castles, writing from a comparative perspective, has shown 
clearly how policy agendas about multiculturalism are shaped by the socio-
economic and political realities of the migration process itself. Drawing on his 
research in Europe and Australasia he argues that immigrants cannot simply 
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be incorporated into society as individuals, that a large proportion of 
immigrants and their immediate descendants cluster together, partly as a result 
of cultural affinity, but above all as a reaction to experiences of racism and 
marginalisation (Castles 1996: 54-55). 
 
There are clearly quite divergent perspectives in the present political 
environment about how best to deal with all of these concerns. A number of 
commentators have pointed to the limitations of legislation and public policy 
interventions in bringing about a major improvement in the socio-political 
position of minorities. Anti-discrimination policies, for example, have had at 
best a limited impact on the root causes of discrimination in key social arenas 
such as employment, housing and social services. At the same time the 
development of new minority communities, e.g. of asylum seekers and 
refugees in the period since the 1990s, has introduced new issues that have to 
be confronted in order to tackle contemporary manifestations of racism and 
racial inequality. 
 
Any rounded analysis of citizenship and of inclusion and exclusion in Europe 
has to include a discussion of immigration controls, which are inseparable 
from the grounds for including some and excluding others. It is at the point of 
entry that distinctions between those who ‘belong’, who have an absolute right 
to enter, and ‘others’ are drawn. Those others may be permitted to enter, but it 
is at the discretion of the state issuing visas, and different conditions apply to 
different groups. 
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Turning to citizenship, seen by many as an important locus of the struggle for 
inclusion, there are a number of contending approaches. We distinguish very 
broadly in what follows between those scholars who argue that national 
citizenship is giving way to a transnational or postnational citizenship, and 
those who view national citizenship as resilient. These positions are then 
subdivided into those who view the demise or subordination of the nation-state 
positively and those who view it negatively. Those who insist on the strength 
of the nation-state are also similarly divided. This does not exhaust or 
represent all possible positions on the question of citizenship, just some of 
those whose work is much discussed at the moment. Additionally, this 
illustrates the connections between particular views of the current role of 
nation-states and the representation of migration and migrants in the work of 
the different authors discussed. It also needs to be emphasised that the work of 
some of the specific authors discussed under one or other of these positions, 
link up to other positions. What we have sought to emphasise are the core 
arguments associated within each position. 
 
The Decline of the Nation-State: A Positive Development 
The first position is emblematically associated with the work of Yasemin 
Soysal, particularly her book on The Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and 
Postnational Membership in Europe. For Soysal: ‘Citizenship defines 
bounded populations, with a specific set of rights and duties, excluding 
“others” on the grounds of nationality’ (1994: 2, 120, 137). Importantly, she 
goes on to note that within the current national model ‘citizenship assumes a 
single status; all citizens are entitled to the same rights and privileges’ (1994: 
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141). She argues, however, that some of these social, political and economic 
rights are shared by people resident in national polities who do not have the 
citizenship of those polities. This leads Soysal to argue that a ‘postnational 
citizenship’ is emerging, and that universal personhood, not national 
citizenship, is the basis of membership in host polities. 
 
Elsewhere Soysal writes that citizenship ‘denotes participatory practices and 
contestations in the public sphere’ (1997: 510), and claims that non-citizens 
resident in European democracies can and do participate in the public sphere. 
Others such as Brubaker (1989a, 1989b), Cohen (1987), Hammar (1986, 
1990), Heisler and Heisler (1990), Morris (1997b) and Layton-Henry (1992) 
have examined the stratified and differentiated distribution of rights and 
argued that non-citizens who are resident in and enjoy some rights but not 
others are more accurately described as helots or denizens, that is, they enjoy a 
status that is less than citizenship. Soysal, however, rejects this position and 
argues that by remaining within the confines of the nation-state model, such 
scholars do not recognise the changing basis and legitimacy of membership or 
the recent fundamental changes in the relationship between the individual, the 
nation-state, and the world order (1994: 139). She points, for example, to the 
ways in which increasingly the ‘claims making’ strategies of minorities are 
focused beyond the nation state and address universal notions of human rights. 
 
Soysal’s analysis has been influential and remains an important point of 
reference in the growing literature on migration and citizenship. There are, 
however, a number of issues that she does not fully address. In particular, she 
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does not give due weight to (i) the significance of the differentiation between 
non-EU, and especially non-European citizens, and ‘national citizens’ or to (ii) 
the position of a growing population of resident aliens, who because they are 
not allowed to work legally, do not have access to the rights and privileges she 
details. These include undocumented migrants and asylum seekers. Soysal 
does say that ‘the national citizenship model is a social construction [that] has 
reality as a model’ (1994: 2 ftn). It is her contention, however, that it has been 
superseded by a postnational citizenship that allows individuals to claim and 
exercise rights across borders. 
 
Though Soysal is perhaps the best known representative of this position, she is 
not alone in hailing the rise of a transnational citizenship. Saskia Sassen, for 
example, accepts that ‘the state continues to play the most important role in 
immigration-policy making and implementation’ (1998: 49), but argues that 
the sovereignty of states is constrained by a range of rights and obligations, 
internal and external pressures that ‘undermine old notions about immigration 
control’ (1998: 57). These limits on state sovereignty are, according to Sassen, 
imposed by the judiciary in each country, citing occasions when the courts 
have rejected government restrictions on family reunification or the right to 
seek asylum (1998: 58). Sassen also refers to the increased prominence of the 
European Union in ‘visa policy, family reunification, and migration policy’, 
implying that the EU exerts a strong degree of influence on national policy in 
these areas. 
 
The EU is a growing and significant player in relation to these issues. It seems 
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clear, however, that the EU acts not as a supranational entity but as an 
intergovernmental body. While the Treaty of Amsterdam shifted responsibility 
for asylum and immigration issues from the intergovernmental 3rd pillar to the 
communautaire 1st pillar, these issues remain for the time being subject to 
unanimity voting, ensuring that policy continues to governed by consensus 
between the individual states. Furthermore, EU policy in this area is 
dominated by the more powerful states who transmit their agendas to less 
powerful states via EU fora (Schuster 2000).  
 
Soysal and Sassen highlight real trends and developments. But, as we shall 
argue later, it seems to us that they overestimate the benefits of 
transnationalism and the number of people who enjoy them. There is also a 
tendency in their work to characterise intergovernmental institutions, where 
power remains with individual states, as supranational, or above states. 
 
The Decline of the Nation-State: A Negative Development 
Sharing the view that the nation-state has declined, but arguing that this is not 
a positive development are scholars such as David Jacobson (1996) and 
Horsman and Marshall (1994). Jacobson accepts the argument that we are 
witnessing a decline in citizenship, and a growth in transnational rights, that is 
the rights of migrants in their countries of residence. Like Sassen, he cites the 
impact of regional judicial bodies, ‘such as the European Court of Human 
Rights and the European Court of Justice’, which he argues have grown in 
influence such that ‘the judicial tail is wagging the legislative dog’ (1996: 13). 
While Soysal and Sassen see these as positive developments, Jacobson regards 
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them as dangerous – a hollowing out of what is a fundamental status – 
citizenship - and a constraint on the sovereign powers of the state. Citizenship, 
according to Jacobson, fulfills two important tasks: it determines the criteria of 
membership and ‘the “conversation” between the individual and the state’. He 
argues that citizenship is being eroded by transnational migration, since 
‘social, civil, economic, and even political rights have come to be predicated 
on residency, not citizenship’ (1996: 9).  
 
For Jacobson, the decoupling of rights from citizenship raises questions about 
the legitimacy of states, endangering the ‘pact’ between state and citizen and 
eroding the distinction between citizen and alien (1996: 83). He refers to the 
relationship between the state and the international order as a dialectical one, 
in which the state is necessary for advancing and institutionalising human 
rights, and that as a result state bureaucracy grows. This development is, 
however, part of a process whereby the state is ‘becoming an institutional 
mechanism of a transnational order based on human rights’ and authority and 
legitimacy are being transferred to that transnational order (1996: 14-15, 76), 
so that though the state is ‘bigger’ it is also less powerful1.  
 
Horsman and Marshall also argue that the ‘traditional nation-state…is under 
threat’ (1994: ix). For them, however, migration is only one contributory 
factor among others and, unlike Jacobson, they are not so much concerned by 
the loss of something positive, as worried by the absence of an effective 
candidate to replace the nation-state and the prospect of ‘a period of prolonged 
instability and uncertainty’ (1994: xi). This instability is due to fragmentation 
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of the old order – the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of nationalism and 
‘tribalism’, and the erosion of the territorial state. They also argue that it is 
exacerbated by growing differences, primarily economic, between the core 
and the periphery. Porous borders that blur the division between core and 
periphery, allowing refugees and the poor to penetrate a world previously safe 
within its borders, add to this instability, which ‘may prove even more 
threatening to the economic system than organised communism and the Soviet 
threat could ever be’ (1994: 60). 
 
The two broad positions just outlined acknowledge the continuing power of 
the nation state, but argue that this power is limited both internally and 
externally. Jacobson focuses more on the internal constraints inherent in 
liberal democracies, while Horsman and Marshall highlight more systemic 
threats to the nation-state, in particular from international capitalism. We want 
to move on now to look at some perspectives that argue that the nation-state 
remains the key actor in this area. 
 
The Survival of the Nation-State: A Positive Development 
The third position is exemplified by the work of Rogers Brubaker (1992 and 
1995), though it is also a perspective that is to be found in the work of Gary 
Freeman (1986, 19995 and 1998), Christian Joppke (1996, 1999a and 1999b) 
and Lydia Morris (1997a and 1997b) among others. For Brubaker national 
traditions of citizenship are not as responsive to migration movements as, for 
example, Soysal would suggest. He is wary of entrenching the differential 
status of migrants, arguing that the extension of certain rights, but not others to 
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migrants to encourage integration may in fact trap them in an intermediate 
status. In essence he sees the nation-state as the key form of political 
organisation in the contemporary environment, despite the challenges posed 
by migration and new forms of citizenship rights granted to migrants.  
 
Though argued from a rather different starting point, for Gary Freeman too the 
nation-state remains perhaps the main actor in this arena. He argues forcefully 
'that there is little justification for declaring that migratory regulatory regimes 
are on the verge of catastrophic breakdown or that they have little meaning 
these days' (1998: 93). He points out that the ability of states to control 
migration varies from country to country, and that migration that occurs 
outside legal channels is hardest to control, not least because of the increasing 
sophistication of those who traffic in migrants. Nonetheless, Freeman argues 
that state controls are also increasingly sophisticated though incomplete (1998: 
96-97). For Freeman, these controls are necessary (1986). He insists that the 
welfare state is dependent on boundedness and the particular claims of 
citizens. He argues that empirically the welfare state must be bounded and 
moreover that it depends on kinship 'because a community with shared social 
goods requires for its moral base some aspect of kinship or fellow feeling' 
(1986: 52). Migration must therefore be controlled and channelled to preserve 
the rights and welfare of the citizenry. While the state’s controls are imperfect 
(1998: 97), Freeman argues that the struggle to maintain control is one that 
must and should continue. 
 
A modified model that includes elements of the position of Brubaker, as well 
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as Soysal, is at the core of Christian Joppke’s analysis. He argues that 
‘immigration…revealed citizenship in a new, post-Marshallian light, as a legal 
status and identity that excludes rather than includes people’ (1999: 630). 
Joppke consciously tries to situate his position as one that goes beyond what 
he sees as the limitations of both the ‘transnational’ and ‘nation-state’ models 
of analysis, and makes a claim to moving beyond the limitations of both 
Soysal and Brubaker in his comparative analysis of trends and policies 
towards migrants in Britain, Germany and the United States of America. 
 
Taking a somewhat different position, Lydia Morris has ‘noted a number of 
limitations to what are popularly perceived to represent postnational or global 
trends’ (1997b: 200), especially the means used by the European states to 
preserve rather than pool their sovereignty within the EU. She is persuaded by 
arguments that EU citizenship is derivative of, and dependent on the nation-
states of the Union (1997b: 198). Morris’s analysis focuses particularly on the 
use of legal instruments - Maastricht, Amsterdam, European Commission 
declarations and recommendations – in shaping migration, rights and 
membership within EU states. But she also argues forcefully that 
‘international rights for migrant populations are narrowly defined and not 
easily realised in practice’ (Morris 1997a: 207). 
 
While all of these authors are sensitive to the challenges faced by nation-
states, each insists on the continuing power and rights of those states to 
regulate, however imperfectly, entry into their territory and membership of 
their collectivities. This is seen as essential to the survival of nation-states, 
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which are seen as the best providers of stability and welfare for their 
populations. In the next section, this positive evaluation of the nation-state is 
disputed. 
 
The Survival of the Nation-State: A Negative Development 
The final position we want to briefly outline here is closest to our own 
thinking. The proponents of this position acknowledge constraints on nation-
states – not least as a result of the state system of which they are members, but 
highlight the continued power of states in relation to their own populations and 
would-be entrants and the negative impact of the exercise of that power on 
minorities, migrants and potential migrants. This position shares with Freeman 
and Joppke the argument that the nation-state plays the key role in shaping 
citizenship rights, though the impossibility of maintaining complete control of 
borders is also acknowledged.  
 
In ‘Racism, Migration and the State’, Bovenkerk, Miles and Verbunt (1990) 
contended that the influence of the state 'on the social, economic and political 
position of migrants is far greater than has been recognised by scholars who 
have studied the migration process so far' (1990: 480). The state in this 
account is understood as a contradictory complex of institutions such that 
policy relating, for example, to migration control and social inclusion or 
exclusion is a result of conflict and contestation between the institutions of the 
state. Bovenkerk et al argue that ‘The escalation of intervention to regulate 
international migration…provides an excellent illustration of increasing state 
power’ (1991: 481). They go on to point out that ‘the economic and social 
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circumstances of the population living within the boundary of the nation are 
no less determined by state decisions’ (1991: 482).   
 
Stephen Castles (1996; see also Castles and Miller, 1998 and Castles and 
Davidson 2000) also acknowledges the continued significance of the nation-
state. Castles’ main concern is to investigate the extent to which migrants are 
still denied significant rights. While he does not question the trend towards 
globalisation he also seeks to show that ‘nation-state citizenship’ is still an 
important determinant of the everyday experiences of ‘non-citizens’. Much of 
Castles work has been organised around the ways in which societies as diverse 
as Australia, Britain and France have responded to the challenges that 
ethnically and culturally diverse populations pose for the nation-state model of 
the citizen as a national (Castles and Davidson 2000). He acknowledges the 
importance of the growing number of transnational communities who live in 
more than one society, and have multiple identities. But he also argues 
strongly for the need to link the analysis of citizenship to an account of the 
role of national, local and transnational processes in shaping the everyday 
experiences of migrant communities and ethnic minorities. 
 
These examples illustrate but do not exhaust the different conceptual 
approaches with which we engage. They can best be seen as an attempt to 
outline the broad contours of current academic debates, which in themselves 
do not fully capture the complex political and ideological debates about 
citizenship and immigration that are shaping contemporary European 
societies. It is to these debates that we now turn, drawing on some elements of 
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our recent research in order to give some substance to the themes that we have 
touched upon from a conceptual angle above. 
 
 
Political and Policy Agendas on Migrants and 
Minorities 
We now turn to an examination of the situation in the countries where we have 
focused our own empirical research, namely Britain, Germany, France and 
Italy. During the course of the research in 1999 and 2000 we carried out 80 
interviews in these four countries with representatives of minority and migrant 
organisations, campaign and lobby groups, government officials and civil 
servants. In addition we carried out interviews in Brussels in order to explore 
developments at the level of the European Union. Our primary goal was to 
uncover the changing terms of public debate in each national situation. Linked 
to this overarching concern we also want to see whether the public debates 
link up to the concerns of the academic and theoretical controversies we have 
been discussing. 
 
During the course of the interviews we carried out we focused on three broad 
themes: citizenship, integration2 and entry. We decided not approach the 
interviewees with particular definitions of each of these terms, but instead to 
explore during the interviews what is understood by the terms. In each case we 
were anxious to make explicit both the similarities and the differences 
between the different national discourses, as well as the differences and 
similarities that exist between academic, political and activists’ discourses and 
 18 
those of the migrant groups. 
 
Citizenship 
What seems clear initially is that in each of the four national states, citizenship 
is a key term in debates about minorities and immigration though in quite 
distinctive ways. In Germany, for example, discussions on citizenship have 
focussed overwhelmingly on the Turkish minority and dual citizenship, that is, 
on whether or not long-term residents should be allowed access to all of the 
rights enjoyed by German citizens. As one Turkish German citizen explained, 
German citizenship (acquired through marriage) meant that he could be 
politically active, could be critical of the German state without worrying about 
being deported. That the German constitution extends this protection de jure 
(Art.19 [4]), if not de facto, to citizens and non-citizens alike seems not to 
have reassured members of a community that have been in Germany for 
generations in some cases.  
 
According to Ismail Kosan, a Green MP in the Berlin City Parliament, while 
the new law might be a major psychological step for the Germans, it will not 
make a huge difference to non-Germans. Because it is only granted to children 
born in Germany of parents legally3 resident there for a minimum of eight 
years, and can be forfeited at twenty-three if the second citizenship is not 
renounced, it is not as secure as ‘real’ German citizenship. Nonetheless, it 
would mean that (as happened in 1999) a thirteen year old born in Bavaria 
could not have been deported to Turkey, a country he had seldom visited, 
whose language he did not speak, because of his ‘delinquency’.  The fall in the 
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number of applications for naturalisation can, however, be taken as evidence 
that the new law is seen as regressive by migrant communities. 
 
In Britain, by contrast, the debates surrounding citizenship have focused 
primarily on a move in the opposite direction. Successive Acts of Parliament 
(the 1962 and 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Acts, the 1971 Immigration 
Act and the 1981 British Nationality Act) have sought to define a national 
citizenship by excluding groups of people who previously had automatic rights 
to citizenship (Cohen 1997; Dummett and Nicol 1990). The purpose of these 
changes has been to remove from certain categories of people a fundamental 
right of citizenship – that of entry to the state.  This process began with 
commonwealth immigrants, East African Asians and continued with British 
Hong Kong citizens. The end result was a menu of different citizenship 
statuses, each with a greater or lesser range of rights.  
 
In Italy, which has a more recent history of immigration, differentiated access 
to citizenship was introduced in 1992.  Prior to that date legal residence for 
five years was necessary for naturalisation, but the new law reduced this 
period to three years for ‘ethnic’ Italians, while increasing it to ten years for 
other applicants. In Italy, citizenship is generally understood as a legal status 
rather than as a bundle of rights in the Marshallian sense, though according to 
Ferrucio Pastore, of the Centro Studi di Political Internazionale, this latter use 
of the word is now beginning to surface (Interview, 10 November 1999).  
 
In France, it is not the acquisition of citizenship that is at stake, but its 
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meaning and the demands it places on those who acquire it. Until the Pasqua 
laws Ius Soli guaranteed that anyone born in France automatically acquired 
French citizenship, and though the ‘Pasqua laws’ have been superceded by the 
Debré and Chevenement laws (Lessana 1998), the automatic and irrevocable 
nature of French citizenship has been altered4.  
 
In popular discourse in Britain, France and Germany, there is an idea that the 
acquisition of citizenship by ‘foreigners’ is a conscious strategy to exploit a 
valuable commodity, and that somehow national citizenship is thereby 
devalued, especially when, as is frequently assumed in the press, there is little 
desire to integrate.  
 
Integration 
The question of integration represents symbolically a complex set of issues, 
often closely linked to questions of citizenship. For example, Guido 
Menghetti, of the Citizenship Section in Italy’s Ministry of the Interior, argued 
that Italy’s 1992 citizenship law had been framed with a view to promoting 
integration5. He claimed that, as in Germany, there were ideological divisions 
on the place of naturalisation in the integration process with those on the left, 
especially the far-left, seeing it as a first step, while those on the right present 
it as the goal of an integration process, ie the final step.  
 
In Germany there are also clear contrasts between the positions of political 
parties vis à vis integration and citizenship, linked to their ideological 
perspective. As Christian Senft of the CDU in Berlin explained, the German 
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Union parties also see citizenship as the end-point of integration, a reward for 
assimilation. The SPD, the Greens/Bündnis 90 and both the Türkische 
Gemeinde zu Berlin and the Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg saw it as 
a necessary though not sufficient means to integration. In France, too, there 
was an expectation that people should ‘integrate’, though in both cases, when 
the word ‘integration’ was used, it was often difficult to distinguish it from 
‘assimilation’, and a third term ‘insertion’ was used in both France and Italy. 
However, the dominant discourse in all four countries, even Britain with its 
celebrated ‘multicultural’ model, is of the need for newcomers to adapt to host 
society norms of behaviour, though these are not easy to identify. 
 
The question of language was perhaps most important in Germany as a key 
element in the discussion about integration. For politicians from across the 
German political spectrum, the answer to the challenge represented by this 
growing number of marginalised and ‘dangerous youth’ is language training 
and education, but none are prepared to finance more than token projects. For 
the community leaders and the people they represent, integration is dependent 
on equal rights, something they do not enjoy and that they cannot begin to 
enjoy without citizenship rights – political as well as economic. 
 
In France the discussion has a different shape and cuts sharply across party 
ideology. The opposing ‘ideal’ models are Republican integration or Anti-
Republican multiculturalism and elements of both are found in the main 
parties. However, this simplistic dichotomy is much more complex on the 
ground. Multiculturalism is not generally regarded positively – citizenship 
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means full membership in the Republic, and migrants are expected to become 
fully integrated – assimilated (Weil and Crowley 1994). In which case, it 
makes no sense to speak of minorities, since all are equally French – according 
to the official discourse (Martiniello 1998). The British model of a 
multicultural society with different and distinct minority groups, and political 
mobilisation of those groups is seen as divisive and politically dangerous.  
 
Entry 
In political debates and much academic discourse, integration is tightly allied 
to entry controls. In France, for example, commentators refer to a dual policy 
of stopping immigration and promoting integration (Lessana 1998: 126). In 
Britain, in parliamentary debates on the 1993 and 1996 Asylum and 
Immigration Acts, the dependence of good race relations on strict entry 
controls was stressed. The violent attacks on foreigners in Germany were 
explained by Germany’s failure to control the entry into its territory of large 
numbers of asylum seekers. In both France and Italy, much of the discussion 
in relation to migration relates to so-called ‘clandestine’ migration. And yet, 
the closure of borders to migrants makes irregular entry inevitable – a fact 
accepted by Italy and Spain, who have both introduced legal channels of 
migration – even though their unemployment rates are higher than those of 
Britain, France and Germany.  
 
One of the concerns we have about current debates in sociology and politics 
about integration, multiculturalism and the rights of non-citizens, is that they 
have tended to focus on those legally resident within the state (Hollifield 1992; 
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Cornelius et al 1994; Soysal 1994; Koopmans and Statham 1999), rather than 
on undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, whose position is steadily 
worsening, and would-be migrants who are denied access. There are 
exceptions to this general trend (Morris 1997b; Castles and Miller 1998; 
Castles and Davidson 2000), but on the whole, the marginal and vulnerable 
position of asylum seekers, who are stigmatised as bogus or abusive claimants, 
and of undocumented workers, described as illegal and hence criminal, is 
skimmed over in the texts dealing with migration, or are not adequately 
integrated into the wider context, or are the subject of studies that treat them as 
completely distinct from migrants.  
 
It is not possible to ignore the importance of entry controls when examining 
migration, citizenship or integration. Entry controls by their very nature are 
selective, distinguishing between those who have the right to enter and those 
who don’t, between welcome and unwelcome visitors. To argue that 
integration and societal harmony are dependent on entry controls is to ignore 
their divisive function (Solomos 1993; Cohen 1987; Castles and Miller 1998), 
and enable governments to continue to focus on restrictions, to the detriment 
of policies to include minorities and migrants. 
 
The Changing Boundaries of Citizenship 
What do the debates analysed above tell us about the changing boundaries of 
citizenship in contemporary Europe? Citizenship is of enormous importance in 
enabling groups to claim economic and political rights. In Italy and Germany, 
for example, the battle for easier naturalisation is a focus for mobilisation 
 24 
among migrant communities. But in France and Britain the possession of 
formal citizenship has not led to substantial equality with the white majority 
population. Providing testimony to the distinctions that are made on the basis 
of colour6 regardless of citizenship is the degree of support enjoyed by the Far 
Right in France who demand the repatriation of non-assimilable ‘Beurs’, the 
continuing high level of racist attacks against foreigners in Germany and a 
series of racist murders such as Stephen Lawrence’s in Britain. 
 
In all of these countries, racism intersects with class so that, for example, 
decisions on who may enter are taken on the basis of the – usually economic – 
contribution that an individual can make to the host society. The hostility 
directed at newcomers, especially those from Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania 
is as much a response to their poverty as to their perceived otherness. This is 
why it is important to explore and reflect the different agendas of different 
groups (and classes) in each country, and to ask whether parallel agendas are 
to be found in the different countries and if not, why not. In this section of the 
paper we want to explore the shifting boundaries of citizenship at a number of 
different levels. 
 
Global 
If citizenship is to be understood as a ‘bundle of rights’ pace Marshall, then 
Human Rights are the concomitant of a global citizenship. The difficulty with 
this idea is that, without a state to enforce them, human rights can remain 
largely a rhetorical device. The idea of a global citizenship may have some 
resonance, but in reality it remains trapped in the web of national sovereignty 
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and dependent on resources. Those who truly enjoy global citizenship are 
those whose wealth allows them to pass quickly and efficiently through the 
inconveniences of immigration control, for example. 
 
Over the past few decades European societies have experienced a wide range 
of migration patterns. Bovenkerk, Miles and Verbunt distinguished four 
analytically distinct migration movements since 1945: ‘(i) of owners of 
wealth, along with managerial and technical staff of international companies; 
(ii) of (industrial) workers; (iii) of colonial subjects; and (iv) of refugees’ 
(1990: 478-479). Given this diversity, it is worth emphasising that the bundle 
of rights enjoyed by these four groups are also distinct. If we identify the most 
significant rights attached to global citizenship as, for example, free 
movement, representation and protection by and from states (the issue of 
welfare rights is dealt with below), then global citizenship would appear to be 
a status enjoyed by a limited number of people, in particular those belonging 
to the first group identified above. Though the other three groups can and do 
move around the globe – it is with progressively less ease, their interests are 
less well represented (if at all) and they enjoy progressively less protection by 
and from states. For the majority of the world’s population, global citizenship 
has little substantive reality. Of more significance, however, in contemporary 
debates is the issue of European citizenship.  
 
European 
Europe is sometimes offered as an example of a postnational (and 
postmodern) polity (Diez 1996), of a quasi-state with a distinctive citizenship 
 26 
complete with passports. Postnationalists such as Soysal see the strengthening 
of the supranational level as a gain for migrants and an indication of the 
direction in which citizenship can and should evolve. Part of the argument is 
that European Citizenship confers rights that national citizenship does not – 
for example, the right to work in other EU member states and to access 
welfare benefits. An underlying argument here is that if EU citizenship was 
extended to non-EU citizens, this would give them access to to European 
Courts and free mobility within the EU. With the exception of Britain, 
Denmark and Ireland, non-EU citizens legally resident in any of the other 12 
states already enjoy this right. According to this account, borders are 
becoming less significant and migrants are increasingly accessing the rights 
previously reserved for national citizens. 
 
Others see this as a threat to national citizenship, a trend that should be 
resisted because it blurs the distinction between citizen and non-citizen, 
loosening the ties that bind citizens together and that make membership of a 
state meaningful. The argument here seems to be that if there is no longer any 
distinction between them and us, if the state provides them with all of the 
benefits (especially welfare benefits) to which we are entitled, why should we 
owe any special allegiance to our state? 
 
In our research in each of the four states, we were anxious to test these 
hypotheses against the experiences of these bearers of postnational rights. We 
began first in the capital of this postnational polity, namely Brussels. Taha 
Mellouk of the Migrants Forum in Brussels7, raised the issue of a European 
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citizenship, not tied to particular national citizenships. He argued that a goal of 
the Migrants Forum is the acquisition of European citizenship for non-EU 
citizens and that this might be a way of guaranteeing certain rights to long-
term residents as a way-station on the road to full citizenship. However, 
though this question was raised with representatives of migrant groups in the 
four national contexts, none of them saw this as a way forward and certainly 
not as an alternative to national citizenship.  
 
Richard Lewis, of the Task Force charged with promoting cooperation in the 
fields of Justice and Home Affairs within the EU warned that European and 
national citizenship were quite different and should not be confused8. 
European citizenship is still wholly dependent on citizenship of  an EU 
member-state, that is, national citizenship. European citizenship adds little to 
the privileges already enjoyed by the citizens of EU states. Its primary 
function seems to be facilitate the free movement of European workers and 
managers within the Union. It has no relevance to asylum seekers or 
undocumented workers. For those non-EU citizens legally resident in an EU 
state, it is not European citizenship that allows them to move between 
countries, but intergovernmental agreements such as Schengen.  
 
Non-European workers enter the member states of the EU by virtue of 
bilateral agreements with, for example, Italy and Spain (France and Germany 
too, though to a lesser extent today). Whatever rights they enjoy, they enjoy 
because of their citizenship of a nation-state, or because of their membership 
of trade unions. While former colonial subjects had access to, for example, 
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Britain and France, increasingly the right of entry is reserved for those in 
possession of national citizenship. For protection, most still have recourse to 
the state whose citizenship they hold – as for example when Algeria 
threatened to stop sending workers to France in the 1970s or more recently 
when Morocco voiced concern about the attacks on migrant workers in the 
south of Spain (The Guardian, 14 February 2000). Though the EU has 
affirmed its commitment to anti-discrimination, so far only Britain and the 
Netherlands have anti-discrimination legislation in place. 
 
National 
In the current environment national citizenship remains the single most 
important means of protecting migrants and minorities within Europe from 
being excluded or expelled from a European state. Only citizenship guarantees 
the right of access to the territory of the state and protection from deportation. 
Only citizenship guarantees at least a degree of representation, the right to 
stand in elections and to hold public office. Recent research has shown that 
legal status is the most significant factor in the integration of people into the 
host society (Bloch 2000). This is because it offers a degree of security that 
non-citizens do not have.  
 
This is not to suggest that the acquisition of citizenship will resolve all, or 
even most of the problems facing minorities and migrants. The experience of 
Britain and France is clearly a case in point. Minority groups in both countries 
are, in the words of Michel Wieviorka9, included civilly, but socially 
excluded. Nonetheless, within the current system, national citizenship remains 
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an indispensible weapon in the struggle for equality. This is not an argument 
for the retention of nationally and territorially bounded citizenship, rather it is 
recognition that national and territorial boundaries are important sites of 
inclusion and exclusion. We began the previous section by arguing that issues 
of citizenship, integration and entry were closely linked and it is at the border 
that they meet. It is at the border that distinctions are drawn between the 
holders not just of EU and non-EU passports, but between the citizens of 
Western and Eastern European states, new and old Commonwealth states, 
between the citizens of rich and poor states and between rich and poor 
generally.  
 
Local 
It is arguable that it is at the local level that most progress has been made. As 
yet our research in this area is still in its early stages. Nonetheless, in the 
interviews that we have so far conducted certain tentative impressions have 
been made. The concept of local citizenship – voting and or standing in local 
elections, becoming a local business leader, developing community 
associations that link up with the host society – is a very important means of 
inclusion. Though this kind of local citizenship does not confer rights that can 
be exercised, embeddedness within the local community does offer an avenue 
for political mobilisation and community based action and a minimal form of 
protection. 
 
In the British context, for example, local political institutions became an 
important focus for minority political mobilisation during the 1980s and 1990s 
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(Solomos and Back 1995). This has not been possible to the same extent 
elsewhere. Very few representatives of different minorities have managed to 
gain access to regional parliaments in Germany, and most of these have been 
members of  the Green party10. But at community and district level, political 
activity, according to some of our interviewees offered the possibility of 
making small, but important concrete gains. As Sabour Zamani of the Afghan 
Cultural Centre11 pointed out, groups such as his had little hope of influencing 
national policy, and it therefore makes more sense to concentrate on the local 
level. 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis outlined above has suggested the need for a sustained rethinking 
of questions about citizenship, immigration and ethnic inclusion and exclusion 
in contemporary European societies. We began by looking at some of the key 
theoretical perspectives that have emerged in recent years and attempted to 
link these debates to trends and developments in our four case study countries. 
Given the exploratory nature of the analysis we want to conclude our 
discussion in this paper by reflecting on some of the main arguments that seem 
to emerge from both our theoretical explorations and empirical research. 
 
There is a need for an analytical framework that allows us to think through the 
various types of migration and movements of people that are shaping our 
social and political environment. Processes of inclusion and exclusion of 
migrants and minorities are varied and can and do occur through different 
mechanisms. In addition it should be evident from the above analysis that 
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some people experience more than one kind of exclusion. It is important to be 
able to account for the political, social, economic and physical patterns of 
exclusion if we are to provide a rounded analysis of the contemporary 
situation in European societies. 
 
The postnational model of citizenship stresses the importance of economic 
rights, and certainly until the 1970s rights to equal pay and contribution based 
benefits in Germany played a role in integrating migrants workers into 
Germany society. But this group enjoy these rights qua workers, not human 
beings. Whatever its shortcomings, it could be argued that the national 
citizenship model still has greater empirical, legal and political reality than 
Soysal’s postnational model.  
 
Political, social and economic exclusion culminate in physical exclusion. This 
occurs most obviously at the border, either with a refusal of permission to 
enter as is frequently the case, or deportation. The importance of not being 
physically included can be seen in the high price that some pay to enter 
European states. The reports in the press of those frozen to death in the 
undercarriages of aircraft, asphyxiated by immigration officers while being 
forcibly deported or committing suicide while in detention awaiting 
deportation are increasing. It is also clear that asylum seekers and refugees are 
increasingly being physically excluded within the territory of nation-states – in 
detention centres, for example.  
 
Not all migrants suffer these extremes. The trends identified by some 
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commentators towards globalisation of labour and the emergence of 
transnational citizenship are real enough for some. It is also clear, however, 
that for everyone who can claim to enjoy global citizenship, there are many 
more who are shut out from every aspect of citizenship. These different forms 
of exclusion emanate from the nation-state. They stunt the development and 
impede the advancement of sizeable minorities within our societies and are the 
reason why it is important to develop an analysis of contemporary trends and 
developments that is sensitive to what is happening at the level of nation-
states, localities and regions as well as the European Union as a whole. It is 
only through such an analysis that we can begin to understand the nature of 
political debates about citizenship, immigration and minorities and the 
possible dangers that lie ahead. 
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Notes 
1
 The judiciary enables the claims-making of individuals and non-state actors against states. 
2
 Subsequently, we chose to follow Bovenkerk et al, substituting the terms inclusion and 
exclusion for integration. A more detailed discussion of this process will be found in a paper 
we are currently preparing – ‘Citizenship, Migration and In/Exclusion: Some Conceptual and 
Methodological Problems’. 
3
 But there is legal and legal. There are thousands of asylum seekers in Germany who have 
had children and been legally resident for eight years or more, but have only an ‘Aufent-
haltsgestattung’ or ‘Aufenthaltsbefugnis’. Only an ‘Aufenthaltserlaubnis’ actually counts even 
though anyone in possession of the lesser status is nontheless legally in Germany. 
4
 Naturalisation is a great deal easier in France than in Germany (length of residence is five, 
not ten years), though some conditions are similar (knowledge of the language and stable 
financial resources). 
5
 Interview, Rome 4 November 1999 
 
6
 This is not to suggest that racism is solely a black and white phenomenon. In Germany, 
Britain and Italy, East Europeans, especially Roma, have been subject to virulent attacks in the 
media and violent attacks on the streets. 
7
 Interview, Brussels 18 May 1999 
8
 Interview, Brussels 12 May 1999 
9
 Interview, Paris 14 June 1999 
10
 These include a Yemeni MP in Hessen, a Polish and 2 Turkish MPs in Berlin,  and an 
Assyrian and a Palestinian in Nordrhein-Westfalen. 
11
 Interview, Berlin 26 June 2000 
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